Once upon a country

I don't usually use my blog space to write book reviews, but I feel this one is worth it. Recently browsing the shelves of the local bookstore in Paris I came across the title above by Sari Nusseibeh, the famous dean philosopher of the Al-Quds University. My curiosity had the better of me. After a week of being consumed by the book and getting some equally curious glances in the metro, at the hairdressor's and from my extended family (I took it to family vacation in Provence where everyone probably thought I didn't harmonise with the peaceful paysages of south of france), I finally finished it at some early hour last night. Of all the books I have read on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this one wins my strong recommendation (not that it needs it).

The autobiography of this Palestinian intellectual, unlike much of what is written on the topic - empty air, biased demagogery, useless 'academic research' looking at the conflict through a 'new' theory - this book is rooted in history of arabs and jews in palestine (though evidently and naturally more of arabs than jews) and enriched by the invaluable personal experiences of the author which put him in position to tell stories hetherto unheard, having served in inofficial capacity as an advisor to Arafat and having been part of countless negotiating teams with the Israelis.

Histon lesson through family history

What is perhaps more unique, is that Nusseibeh is able to tell the story of Palestinians life and struggles in this land not since some arbitrary date (1948, 1967, 2002, etc. etc.) but through the history of Palestinian struggle for nationhood, his father having served as a Minister to King Hussein. In other words, Nusseinbeh was born into Palestinian politics before he himself even knew it - as much he admits. The discussions in the family salon between his father and various dignitaries, Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian, American, British set the scene for his growth and interest in politics, the latter going against his personality, which is more academically inclined than fit for juggling the changing dynamics of this complex region. Nonetheless, in Palestine-Israel, which he pointeldly calls Pal-El, one does not have to go into politics, politics comes to you, with its changing faces, negotiation teams, religious and nationalist factions. Politics has him attacked for applying philosophical principles to Islam, politics has his University almost separated by the Wall, politics engulfs him - to an extent which he leaves the reader feeling - he resents, but
cannot withstand if he wants to have his voice heard. Voice of moderation.

Voice of moderation

As I interpreted it, the book is about the dynamic obstacle course that Palestinian moderates, as he credibly positions himself, have to make deal with to assert their nationalist ambitions. His struggle of a 'moderate' leaves the reader with an incredible sadness and a healthy dose of pessimism for the peace process, if it can still be called so. One of the loudest messages of the book which Nuseibeh repeatedly emphasises, is that being a moderate is a dangerous occupation in Pal-El. For it makes him a walking target, at varying times, of Hamas and Fatah on his 'side of border', and even the Shin Bet, Ariel Sharon, and others who claim him to be 'the most dangerous Palestininan', a 'sheep in wolf's clothing'. Unlike other fascinating episodes Nusseibeh tells with an undeniable skill of a storyteller, this is message that consisentently appears throughout the book. His key point here is that being a moderate (i.e. advocating peaceful resistance and peace negotiations under all cicumstances) is not a position favourite with his fellow Palestinians and indeed their leadership (an interesting question here would be the causality, but I'll leave that for another blog entry) but also, and from my point of view, more surprisngly, with the Israeli politicians.

While observing the dislike of moderates by some factions of the Israeli society with reference to himself, Nusseibeh notes that in general "israelis (repeatedly) went back to the old strategie of hunting down the moderates while leaving the fanatics alone" explaining that "they did this not because our feuding tribes were so far away from peace, but because peace was so near, like a ripe plum reading for picking." He goes on to say that even during the second intifada, "polls on both sides showed that the desire for peace was stronger than the thirst for blood. This scared Sharon as much as it did Sheikh Yassin. If Israeli and Palestininan people were allies in peace, some of our leaders were allies in stroking the conflict." This is perhaps the single most poignant point of the book - the point that peace could have been achieved, at various points, and that it failed not only because of the different positions of the two societies, but because accepting it was not in the best interests of the leadership. Clearly, this is the reason Arafat rejected the historic deal offered to him by Barak, the loss of which - the author seems to concede - was an enormous and perhaps permanent loss for the Palestinian society.

Oslo - everyone's fault?

And it is in this latter part of the book, that the account offered by Nusseibeh, starts to loose some of its credibility. While his desciptions of the dealings of the inner circules of the negotiating teams of the two sides before Oslo are convincing and certainly make for a fascinating read, his analysis of Oslo, while insightful in relating the failure to Arafat's lack of readiness for the talks, faulters somewhat on the analysis of the final failure of Oslo. He seems to be particularly careful in attributing blame. On Arafat role in the matter, he writes apologetically: "for all his failings, and he clearly blew it by not closing some sort of a deal at Camp David - Arafat was neither sufficiently in control nor sufficiently villainous to devise such conspiracy (intifada)." Nusseibeh seems to attribute some failure for Camp David to Arafat, but more his alleged indecision, rather than some express desire to encourage the intifada. It is somewhat understandable he would be of this opinion, even post-mortem of Arafat, given his role in the Palestinian society, and his image as one who has sacrificed everything for the Palestinian cause. Nonetheless, this account of Oslo's failure seems to partition blame to all the participating parties in equal measure, as if he was cutting cake for his children in order for them to avoid fighting for the biggest part. Finally, for Nusseibeh "everyone shares some blame in the summit's failure", which is questionable given his own admission that Arafat said no without making a counter-offer.

If he were to assert that everyone shares some blame in the failure of the peace process in general, this would be a much more palatable proposition. In particular, the parallel construction of settlements by Israel in tandem with the peace negotiations whereby Israel claimed it would withdraw to the 1967 borders, is a point he is undeniably correct in making. Given his familiarity with the key characters of the play, he brings in Olmert to illustrate his point: "in 1997, Ehud Olmert, mayor of Jerusalem, supported the American millionaire Irving Moskowitz who used money from a bingo parlor to build a Jewish neighbourhood in Ras al-Amud an Arab neighbourhood east of the Old City. New regulations were introduced, or the old ones suddenly enforced, to control the institutions they couldn't legally drive out."

Rise of Hamas

Another interesting angle the book takes is on the now much popular and, admittedly pertinent, analysis of the rise of Hamas.
In his view, the islamisation of Palestinian politics dates back to mid-80s . Nusseibeh account serves as a timely reminder of the another tragic mistake of the Israeli policy of support of Islamic factions vs nationalist ones. In particular, he highlights the initial suport of the famous paraplegic Sheikh Yassin as a plausible counter-force to the nationalist aspirations of the Palestinians, and thus Israeli support his 'charity'. Already in those days, the Islamic movement was starting to associate with Muslim Brotherhood and adopted its model of social service provision as a means to win over the minds and souls of ordinary Palestinians. It was a clearly a sign to watch out for, but Israeli wavered on its policy regarding Yassin, at one point releasing him from prison, only to assassinate him again. Of course, that happened when I was in Jerusalem. On the whole, his point on islamic vs nationalist politics is an excellent one, and one which is repeadly made by other experts on the Middle East such as Fred Haliday.

Final word...

Overall, the account offered by the book is riveting in terms of both the detail and the perspective the author offers, his family having over a thousand year history in Jerusalem. While one can select details, as I have above, with which we can agree or disagree, this work demonstrates the humanism of the author - and as he tries to do - of his fellow countrymen. It should be made a mandatory read in both Palestinian and Israeli classrooms. In offering his perspective of the troubles and trebulations of the Palestinian and Israeli politics, it seems that Sari Nusseibeh is following the footsteps of his father, whose life's goal was, as he proudly declares was - "to help his people live in decency and freedom - freedom from foreing oppression, but equally from illusions and from what Kant calls self-imposed immaturity." Perhaps one day he will succeed, inshallah.